There is significant controversy over recent trends in the material and intrinsic quality of jobs. Neo-Fordist theories argue that material conditions such as pay, job security, promotion opportunities, and effort requirements have deteriorated for most of the workforce. Post-Fordist theories argue that new work systems are raising levels of intrinsic rewards such as job challenge, autonomy, and cooperation and are also offering higher wages. This article tests both theories using repeated cross-sectional data from the General Social Survey. Results suggest workers' perceptions of the quality of their jobs remained remarkably stable on most dimensions. It is possible that this reflects various obstacles to recognizing objective changes such as flexible standards of evaluation. But stability may indicate that both schools of thought overestimate the extent of recent changes.
productivity growth, and pressure on both labor costs and existing management practices. Two broad schools of thought have characterized the changes in management and the implications for workers in very different terms.
One school of thought, which may be termed neo-Fordist theory, argues that job quality declined as business responded to crises in the 1980s and early 1990s by rolling back many of labor's postwar gains and by institutionalizing a "lean and mean" philosophy of employment relations (Harrison, 1994) .
Another school of thought, which may be termed post-Fordist theory, argues that job quality likely improved due to changing product markets, the diffusion of information technology, and the adoption of participative management practices, though the extent of change is argued to be contingent on management strategy. The theory recognizes that managers have the power to choose whether to respond to altered conditions by implementing changes that are mutually beneficial for employees and firms (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; Osterman, 1994; Piore & Sabel, 1984; Zuboff, 1988) .
These theories contain clear and contrasting expectations for trends in employee well-being, but existing research generally neglects systematic study of workers' own perceptions of the quality of their jobs. Most studies use standard representative data with information on changes in objective stratification outcomes such as pay and job tenure (e.g., Neumark, 1999) or employ qualitative case studies of the objective and subjective consequences of change for employees in a particular workplace (e.g., Graham, 1993) . How a large sample of workers that is representative of the workforce itself understands changes in the quality of its jobs is important for understanding overall trends in well-being, but it is a neglected dimension of the debate between neo-and post-Fordist perspectives.
This article uses recently available data to examine trends in subjective perceptions of job quality for a nationally representative sample to shed light on this question. The next section describes the neo-Fordist and post-Fordist accounts of recent systemic change in the American workplace and notes some issues in the use of subjective indicators. The next two sections discuss the data, methods, and results. The final sections summarize the results and draw conclusions for further research.
Despite various theoretical expectations that different dimensions of job quality improved or deteriorated significantly, the findings indicate surprisingly little change in workers' views of the quality of their jobs during the 1990s both in terms of overall job satisfaction and in terms of 12 specific facets of job quality. Possible reasons for stability of perceptions and its significance are explored in the discussion and conclusion.
THEORY AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Neo-Fordist theory claims that the quality of jobs for most workers, particularly in terms of material rewards and work pace, declined in the last 20 years. Advocates of this view argue that mean earnings stagnated or fell for most categories of workers and that earnings inequality grew. Job security and internal labor markets deteriorated due to downsizing, outsourcing, and the increased use of contingent employment. Work loads increased as employers sought to extract more effort from workers without a commensurate rise in pay. These trends were facilitated, in part, by a rollback in union influence. Although employers were initially motivated to make these changes by economic difficulties from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, they found these techniques so lucrative that they continued to pursue them even after profits recovered (Graham, 1993; Harrison, 1994; Harrison & Bluestone, 1988; Mishel, Bernstein, & Schmitt, 2001; Schor, 1991; Taplin, 1995;  for relevant reviews, see Kalleberg, 2000; Morris & Western, 1999) .
This strategy has been called neo-Fordist because the basic principles of the traditional firm remain intact and some principles, such as inequality between management and labor, are accentuated. Benefits such as relatively high pay, job security, and career mobility that were extended to workers during the growth years of the postwar period are pared back and apply to a smaller proportion of workers as corporations seek lower costs and leaner workforces. Postwar labor markets were always segmented into more and less privileged groups because high wage employers used low wage subcontractors to buffer fluctuations in demand, but the greater reliance on subcontractors under neo-Fordism exacerbates this dualism and increases the proportion of workers in the low-wage segment (Harrison, 1994; cf. Berger & Piore, 1980; Edwards, 1979) . The new practices also represent an intensification of Taylorism and a return to prewar managerial prerogatives such as tighter work standards, speed ups, and greater management power to flexibly deploy personnel within firms (Dohse, Jürgens, & Malsch, 1985; Graham, 1993; Taplin, 1995) . These developments are assumed to apply to most employees but not to the most privileged, so tests of this theory will include analyses of trends in inequality of job rewards as well as of changing means.
Aspects of the neo-Fordist position receive varied levels of support from other research. Most researchers, regardless of theoretical position, agree that except for a modest increase after 1995, mean earnings stagnated or fell for most categories of workers since the early 1970s in stark contrast to the previous 25 years. Figure 1 shows the dramatic shift in the pattern of mean earnings growth as the steady progress of the first half of the postwar period, an average annual growth rate of 2.26%, gave way to the current extended period of general stagnation (author's calculations; Economic Report of the President, 2001) .
Researchers also agree that the recession of the 1980s was deeper than any since the Great Depression and had dramatic effects on the U.S. employment system such as acceleration in the rate of union decline. Earnings inequality also grew rapidly in the 1980s, reaching levels unprecedented in the postwar period. The pattern in the 1990s was somewhat more complex. Overall measures of inequality grew modestly because the more robust economy generated wage gains for those in lower decile relative to the median, which had an equalizing effect on the earnings distribution, but a growing gap between the top decile and the median in the same period had an offsetting disequalizing effect (Bernstein & Mishel, 1997; Katz & Autor, 1999; Katz & Murphy, 1992) .
There is now general agreement that job security and internal labor markets also eroded in the 1990s, but the effect fell disproportionately on whitecollar and more educated workers, narrowing some of the insecurity gap between more and less privileged workers (Aaronson & Sullivan, 1998; Farber, 1997; Heckscher, 1995; Hirsch, 1993; Mishel et al., 2001; Neumark, 1999; Osterman, 1996) . Handel / PERCEIVED JOB QUALITY 69 Trends in Real Hourly Wages, 1947 7.5 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Year
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Claims regarding increased work loads and stress are more disputed, although there is agreement that new quality control techniques, often criticized as work intensification devices, diffused widely in the 1980s and 1990s (Bluestone & Rose, 1998; Cappelli & Neumark, 2001; Graham, 1993; Mishel et al., 2001; Osterman, 2000; Robinson & Bostrom, 1994; Schor, 1991; Taplin, 1995; cf. Green, 2001) .
In short, research using objective indicators suggests significant workplace changes in the direction hypothesized by neo-Fordist theory. However, there are almost no studies that seek to understand how employees as a whole understand or evaluate any of these trends (see Schmidt, 1999 , for an exception).
Post-Fordist theory describes an alternative model of employment relations that benefits both firms and workers and is claimed to have emerged in response to the same economic crisis described by neo-Fordist theory. The post-Fordist account implies rising job quality both with respect to certain material dimensions (e.g., pay, job security) and, more strongly, with respect to intrinsic rewards (e.g., job challenge, autonomy, workplace cooperation) and working conditions (e.g., decreased physical workloads). According to this view, product market shifts favoring higher quality and more customized goods and the spread of information technology have led to a rollback of traditional Taylorist job design and to a greater use of employee involvement practices such as self-directed work teams. These new arrangements increase job skill requirements, task variety, and job autonomy while decreasing gross physical effort demands. The result is greater workplace cooperation and job enrichment and, in some accounts, higher wages (Appelbaum & Batt, 1994; Appelbaum et al., 2000; Osterman, 1994 Osterman, , 2000 Piore & Sabel, 1984; Zuboff, 1988 ; for a review, see Smith, 1997) .
Some of these ideas build on earlier theories of postindustrialism and postmaterialism. These theories predicted that jobs would become more skilled, remunerative, and enriched as a result of the rising education levels of workers, the increasing proportion of professional and managerial jobs, and the perceived value shift among workers toward more meaningful or intrinsically rewarding work rather than the traditional focus on higher pay (Bell, 1976; United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1973) .
The perspective has been called postindustrial or post-Fordist because it views the recent economic crisis as demonstrating that Taylorism and adversarial employment relations inherited from the industrial era are obsolete. Changing markets and information technology exert pressures to break with Fordism and to institute genuine policies of job enrichment, decentralized decision making, employee teamwork, and management-labor cooperation.
Many proponents are careful to note that broad diffusion of this system is contingent on management's willingness to relinquish traditional prerogatives. The pressures to restructure employment relations do not necessarily translate into real changes in practice (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Zuboff, 1988 ). Management has discretion or agency in deciding whether or how to adapt to these pressures. Nevertheless, there is some expectation and hope of a positive trend.
Evidence from a number of studies supports aspects of post-Fordist theory. The traditional postindustrial indicators of improved job quality, namely, the education levels of workers, the proportion of professionals and managers in the workforce, and the use of computer technology at work, have all increased substantially in recent years (Autor, Katz, & Krueger, 1998) . Research indicates that employees want to be more involved in workplace decisions and that those who participate in employee involvement programs generally endorse them and report greater job satisfaction, autonomy, and intrinsic rewards on average (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Cotton, 1993; Freeman & Rogers, 1999; Godard, 2001; Hodson, 1996 Hodson, , 2001 . The number of workplaces using such practices has also grown over time. According to one time-series estimate, the percentage of workplaces in which more than 50% of employees participated in quality circles and job rotation doubled from 27% in 1992 to 56% in 1997, and many or most of the programs present in 1992 were less than 5 years old (Osterman, 1994 (Osterman, , 2000 . Other studies suggest much less dramatic but still significant levels and growth of employee involvement practices during the 1990s (Cappelli & Neumark, 2001) .
At the same time, some of the same studies suggest that many workers doubt that management is committed to serious change and believe that many programs are token and ineffectual and have offsetting negative implications, such as increased stress, for workers (Barker, 1993; Cotton, 1993; Freeman & Rogers, 1999; Godard, 2001) . Neoinstitutional theory suggests that the apparently wide diffusion of employee involvement practices may mask a paucity of substantive change either positive or negative if adoption is ritualistic or if organizational commitment is weak (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) . Different studies identify bandwagon effects, managerial resistance, and poor implementation as reasons for limited impact (Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999; Vallas, 1999 Vallas, , 2003 Zuboff, 1988) . Findings regarding the impact of employee involvement on wages are quite mixed, and the debate remains unsettled (see Handel & Gittleman, 2004 , for a review). As with the debates over neo-Fordism, there are no studies of the workforce as a whole that examine trends in how employees view the quality of their jobs as it relates to job enrichment, decreased physical effort, and increased cooperation implied by the post-Fordist account.
In sum, a great deal of research has made claims that the general quality of jobs has either declined or improved on various dimensions, but little research has actually examined changes over time in how workers themselves perceive the quality of their jobs.
This gap is significant for several reasons. On the most basic level, it is important to know how the workers in these debates actually understand their situation. All research on the changing objective characteristics of jobs implicitly assumes that improved or deteriorating conditions translate readily into subjective feelings of gain or loss in well-being on the part of workers, but this assumption is rarely tested and is now widely recognized within psychology as problematic (Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999) . For anyone seeking to draw conclusions regarding actors' well-being or utility, which are subjective concepts, this must be considered a significant omission. Indeed, an increasing number of economists, motivated by the recognition that the ultimate standard of economic outcomes is their contribution to subjective well-being, have begun to explore what they call the economics of happiness. As one economist said simply, "Economic things matter only in so far as they make people happier" (Oswald, 1997 ; see also Easterlin, 1996; Frey & Stutzer, 2002) . Sociologists have also begun to examine trends in subjective well-being in relation to income inequality (Hout, 2003) . However, the research within economics has been conducted in complete isolation from the research on inequality growth, and sociological studies also do not focus on the relationship between trends in subjective well-being and workplace-related changes specifically.
Also speaking to the importance of understanding subjective perceptions of job quality is the rather puzzling scarcity of open popular protest regarding the economic hardships identified by neo-Fordist theory and confirmed by subsequent research, coinciding with the nearly complete dominance of freemarket doctrines in the political and economic discourse. Indeed, examining Figure 1 , one would be hard pressed to find a more vivid illustration of Davies's (1962) famous J-curve model relating relative economic deprivation to rising discontent. Some contend that the main explanation for this political quiescence is the decline in support for activist government among the White working class, who continue to support interventionist economic policies in principle but believe they are ineffective in practice or have benefited other groups (Teixeira & Rogers, 2000) . Understanding trends in perceptions of job quality is another important piece of this puzzle.
Finally, on a methodological level, if one is interested in tracking wellbeing over time using alternative indicators, some understanding of the possibilities of subjective measures of well-being is necessary.
Nevertheless, subjective measures also have clear limitations. There are issues of biases toward socially desirable responses in measures of job satisfaction, for example. Issues surrounding the relationship between subjectively perceived and objective reality become more difficult when subjective items are used as proxies for difficult-to-measure objective characteristics such as a job's level of task variety. But little is known about whether such issues are important with respect to the debate over job quality, and the new availability of trend data, in which some biases might difference out, presents an opportunity to examine a new source of information on an important subject.
DATA AND METHOD
This study uses trend data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to examine whether changes in employees' perceptions of job quality correspond to neo-Fordist or post-Fordist predictions. The GSS has a full time series using a single item on overall job satisfaction that extends back to 1972. The GSS also administered 12 more detailed items in two modules on work orientations administered in 1989 and 1998. These items can be grouped into four dimensions of job quality that bear on the debates of neo-Fordism and post-Fordism. They measure employees' perceptions of material rewards (pay, job security, promotion opportunities), intrinsic rewards (interesting job, job autonomy), other working conditions (stress, work load, physical effort, danger), and the quality of workplace interpersonal relations (management-employee relations, coworker relations). These categories are well established in the research literature as key dimensions of job quality and as different facets of the more general construct of overall job satisfaction (Clark, in press; Frey & Stutzer, 2002, p. 103; Kalleberg, 1977; Kalleberg & Reynolds, 2001; Rosenthal, 1989) . Human resource professionals specializing in job analysis and job evaluation also use most of these concepts and similar indicators to rate jobs in determining compensation levels (Milkovich & Newman, 1993) or to understand determinants of turnover, organizational climate, and job satisfaction.
More importantly, the items in these categories directly test for the different predictions of neo-Fordist and post-Fordist theories. Neo-Fordist theory emphasizes deterioration and increased inequality in material rewards but also predicts increased routinization and stress and heavier work loads resulting from the spread of new management techniques such as just-in-time production, peer monitoring, and continuous quality improvement programs (Barker, 1993; Dohse et al., 1985; Graham, 1993; Taplin, 1995) . Post-Fordist theory emphasizes improvements in the quality of work life such as job challenge and autonomy, decreased physical effort, and improved workplace interpersonal relations. It also focuses on potential improvements in pay and job security that result from the higher levels of training, commitment, and discretionary effort required from employees (Appelbaum et al., 2000; cf. Akerlof, 1986) .
Because the two accounts present generally positive or negative overall characterizations of trends in job quality as well as more specific predictions, one would expect employees' responses to both the overall job satisfaction and more specific items to change over time depending on which account was more accurate, allowing for the possibility of offsetting effects, which are investigated below. The 2 years of data on these questions (1989, 1998) cover a period of interest to the job quality debate and are sufficiently far apart that one would expect that significant changes in objective job conditions would register in employees' evaluations. These changes include those highlighted by both neo-Fordist theory such as downsizing and increased employment insecurity and post-Fordist theory such as the spread of computers and employee involvement practices.
The analyses test for simple time trends in both the means and standard deviations of all items because of the neo-Fordist implication that inequality in job quality rose over time and because of the need to test for the possibility of an increasing bifurcation of employment systems as a result of different employers choosing to adopt neo-Fordist or post-Fordist strategies. Regression models with a year dummy for 1998 also control for compositional changes in the sample that may suppress trend effects (education, age, gender, race, marital status, region, industry, and occupation). The analyses also include models that interact the year dummy with earnings and occupation, which are reported where significant, to test for whether inequality in job rewards by strata increased over time. The regressions are ordinary least squares regressions for ease of interpretation, but comparison with identical models using an ordinal logit specification indicates few substantive differences, though t-statistics are sometimes moderately higher in the logit models. 1 For all analyses, the sample is all wage and salary workers responding to the items in the years indicated.
RESULTS

JOB SATISFACTION
The most general measure of perceived job quality is overall job satisfaction. Most researchers consider it a weighted sum of the various specific criteria actors use to evaluate their jobs (Clark, in press; Kalleberg, 1977) . Correlations among overall satisfaction and the more specific job quality variables in the GSS generally support this view, although not all job facets affect overall job satisfaction equally (see Table 1 ). Job satisfaction is most strongly associated with interesting work, followed by positive managementemployee relations and promotion opportunities and then by several job characteristics including subjective pay evaluation, job security, independent work, and positive relations among coworkers. To different degrees, then, overall job satisfaction is a summary measure that incorporates workers' evaluations of both the material and nonmaterial rewards discussed by neo-Fordist and post-Fordist theories.
Turning to consideration of trends, if neo-Fordist theory is correct, one would expect to observe declining levels of job satisfaction reflecting the predominantly negative view of developments in that account. By contrast, if Handel / PERCEIVED JOB QUALITY 75 post-Fordist theory is correct, one would expect to observe job satisfaction rise over time.
The GSS has used a consistent job satisfaction question for all survey years since 1972, and Figure 2 plots the mean and precentage of specific responses for the period of 1989 to 1998, the period covered by the more specific items in the work orientations modules. This item elicits the most positive responses of any examined here and shows no evidence of a time trend. An average of 86% of workers report being very or moderately satisfied with their jobs over the full period, and there is little systematic variation across survey years. Neither the mean nor the standard deviation for 1989 and 1998 are significantly different from one another (see Table 2 ). 2 One possibility is that the apparent constancy in the overall numbers masks offsetting changes resulting from compositional shifts. The workforce has become more white collar and female over time, for example, and these characteristics are associated with higher levels of job satisfaction (Phelan, 1994) , which may suppress a negative time trend within groups resulting from the kinds of changes cited by neo-Fordist theory. The regression results in the first column of Table 3 , which control for a range of characteristics, indicate that this is not the case. There appears to be no trend whatsoever in reported job satisfaction, either positive or negative, for 1989 to 1998. As with all models in this article, a further sensitivity analysis was performed by alternatively interacting year with occupation and earnings to determine whether inequality in job quality across strata increased over time and whether overall stability in the mean of the dependent variable masks offsetting subgroup changes. The interactions were not significant and therefore are not reported.
Although temporal stability in reported job satisfaction has been found in previous decades (Barbash, 1976, p. 22) , an examination of the full GSS time series indicates that relative to the 1970s, reported job satisfaction did decline 78 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / February 2005 NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models control for age, education, gender, race, weekly hours worked, occupation (managers and professionals omitted), industry, marital status and the interaction of marital status with female, and region. Earnings for both 1989 and 1998 are expressed in 1998 dollars. All dependent variables have been recoded so that higher values indicate more positive perceptions. Models in the last two columns also include controls for job values (see Table 4 ). † p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
somewhat in 1980 during the deepest recession since the Great Depression, but it has since remained stable at that lower level through the 2000 survey. This pattern remains even when controlling for the same variables used in the model in Table 3 (author's calculations). Other surveys also show a significant decline in job satisfaction between 1972 and 1977, when the American economy first entered the period of slow growth (Quinn & Staines, 1979, pp. 210-211) . This raises the question as to whether the more recent stability of overall job satisfaction masks more facet-specific positive and negative effects claimed by post-Fordist and neo-Fordist theories that offset one another in respondents' summary evaluations. Unlike most previous work on job satisfaction, the GSS work orientations modules have comparable sets of items on specific job facets for two points in time that can be used to test this possibility. However, most facet-specific results confirm the impression of stability in perceptions of job quality.
MATERIAL REWARDS
Neo-Fordist theory posits declining levels of material rewards resulting from employer efforts to restrain labor costs and increasing inequality of rewards, especially earnings. Post-Fordist theory posits higher levels of skills, training, and workplace cooperation that may raise earnings because they require higher levels of human capital and discretionary effort (cf. Akerlof, 1986) . How have workers' own evaluations of their jobs' material rewards changed over time?
Earnings. Satisfaction with earnings is an obvious place to begin an examination of specific job facets. In the GSS, when workers were asked whether they think their earnings are high, 45% disagreed with that characterization, the least positive responses of all the items examined here. This finding is similar to results in other studies (Alwin, 1987; Gruenberg, 1980; Mirowsky, 1987) .
However, Table 2 indicates that there was no significant change in workers' average evaluations of their pay levels or in the variance of responses between 1989 and 1998. The regression model in the second column of Table  3 also shows no significant time trend. Not surprisingly, log actual earnings (constant 1998 dollars) have a strong effect on perceptions of high earnings, but the interaction of year with a linear earnings term is not significant (β = .003, SE = .058). Although measured earnings inequality increased during the 1990s, at least in terms of the gap between the top and middle of the distribution, interaction terms were not individually or jointly significant when the year dummy was interacted with dummies for income quintiles (F = .85, p = .49).
In general, then, workers did not evaluate their earnings differently over time, and this result does not vary by earnings strata despite some increased inequality in the earnings distribution. This picture is reinforced by GSS data from the same surveys on respondents' job values. Table 4 indicates that the percentage of workers saying they consider high income an important job characteristic actually declined by about 4% between 1989 and 1998, though the difference across years is not statistically significant in an ordinal logit model. The data do not suggest any increase or decrease in workers' concern with earnings over the 1990s.
Job security. In contrast to earnings adequacy, Table 2 indicates there was a significant decline in mean perceptions of job security between 1989 and 1998. The percentage strongly agreeing with the statement that their job is secure declined from 27% to 22%. This decline is consistent with the research on declining job security in the 1990s cited earlier and is also notable because the unemployment rate actually declined from 5.3% in 1989 to 80 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS / February 2005 4.5% in 1998, which would be expected to move perceptions in the opposite direction.
The regression model indicates that the change is entirely a function of a nearly complete erosion of the job security advantage previously held by those with higher earnings, supporting the impression that corporate downsizing made the 1990s a more insecure time for upper income workers than previously. Although the main effect for the dummy for 1998 is now positive, the negative interaction with earnings is so strong that perceived job security is lower for the top four earnings quintiles in 1998. This is consistent with analyses of a longer GSS time series on individuals' perceived probability of job loss and with studies of actual job loss in the 1980s and 1990s, which found both job insecurity and perceptions of insecurity rising for white-collar and more educated workers but not for less skilled workers in the 1990s (Aaronson & Sullivan, 1998; Farber, 1997; Schmidt, 1999) . The impression of greater concern with job security is reinforced by the trend data on job values in Table 4 that shows that the percentage of workers saying they consider job security to be very important rose by about 8% between 1989 and 1998, an increase that is significant in an ordinal logit model (p < .01).
Promotion opportunities. Neo-Fordist theory also argues that downsizing and delayering and a lean approach to staffing have led to the decline of internal labor markets. Table 2 indicates no significant change in mean perceptions of promotion opportunities and a slight decline in the variance of responses to this question. Table 3 shows that the absence of a time trend remains after controlling for compositional changes. There are no significant interactions of year with either income or occupation even though perceptions of job security for those with higher income do seem to have declined over time. Table 4 indicates respondents shifted modestly away from considering promotion opportunities an important job characteristic, but this change is not significant. If there was a decline in internal labor markets in the 1990s, it did not register with respondents as significant or large enough to warrant increased concern.
In sum, among indicators of material rewards, the trend toward increased job insecurity, particularly for those at the upper end of the income distribution, seems to support theories of declining job quality and is consistent with results for objective measures of employment insecurity. However, respondents do not perceive either the adequacy of earnings levels or their promotion prospects any differently in 1998 compared to 1989, supporting neither neo-Fordist or post-Fordist theories on these dimensions of job quality.
For earnings, one possibility suggested by Figure 1 is that workers respond more to changes in personal earnings levels or trajectories than to changes in inequality. This leads one to expect large changes in pay perceptions in the early to mid-1970s, when the U.S. economy made the transition from a regime of steady earnings growth to one of stagnation, rather than in later decades, even though inequality grew most rapidly then. Although the GSS did not ask detailed questions about specific facets of job quality in the 1970s, the Quality of Employment Surveys (QES) collected such data in 1969 , 1972 . This series covers both years immediately preceding and following the slowdown in U.S. earnings growth. The data show that the percentage agreeing strongly that their pay is good dropped from 40% in both 1969 and 1972 to 27% in 1977. There was a similar decline in reported job security (54% vs. 42%) and a smaller decline in reported promotion potential (22% vs. 16%). This suggests that workers' perceptions of all forms of material rewards shifted downward during the 1970s in response to declining economic conditions, but only perceptions of job security declined during the 1990s, when neo-Fordist and post-Fordist theories of economic change crystallized.
However, there is a danger in viewing subjective perceptions as simple reflections of changing objective conditions. The percentage of QES respondents agreeing strongly that their fringe benefits are good declined from 42% to 33% even though the actual average level of benefits reported in the same surveys improved . This suggests perceptions are affected by expectations as well as objective conditions, a point that will be discussed further below.
INTRINSIC REWARDS
If perceptions of job security have declined somewhat and if perceptions of other material rewards are little changed, perhaps the main trends in the 1990s were felt by workers in the area of nonmaterial or intrinsic rewards. The GSS contains two measures of intrinsic job quality: the extent to which respondents find their work interesting and the extent to which respondents can work independently. Despite competing claims of increased control and job enrichment, the raw means and standard deviations also show no significant change over a nearly 10-year period, although the direction of change is negative in the case of whether respondents consider their work interesting (Table 2) . Indeed, the percentage of workers agreeing strongly with the statement that their work is interesting declined from 23.1% in 1989 to 19.4% in 1998, with the neutral response (neither agree nor disagree) growing by roughly the same magnitude.
Controlling for background characteristics, the regression models in Table 3 indicate that the decline in interesting work is significant once compositional changes in the workforce are controlled. There is no evidence of an increase in the perceived scope for working independently in either the raw figures or the regression model. Both findings are contrary to notions that the intrinsic quality of jobs improved as the result of the greater use of teams and other employee involvement practices.
One question this raises is whether expectations for more interesting and autonomous work have risen faster than have changes on the job and masked genuine changes in working conditions. If objective conditions change in a positive direction but subjective standards of evaluation rise faster, the result might be perceptions of declining conditions even when actual conditions improve. Table 4 shows that workers' desires for intrinsic or nonmaterial job rewards have increased over time for both measures, and ordinal logit models confirm these increases are significant (interesting work: p < .01; independent work: p < .05). Except for the growing desire for job security, the overall pattern of results in this table supports the view that workers increasingly seek intrinsic rather than material rewards despite the long-run stagnation in earnings and growth in earnings inequality (Inglehart & Abrahamson, 1994; cf. Easterlin & Crimmins, 1991 ). An exogenous rise in expectations would presumably cause perceptions of job quality to decline even if actual job conditions did not change or improved somewhat.
However, the models for intrinsic rewards in Table 3 include the work values variables as controls. Consequently, the results cannot be attributed to compositional changes in the proportion of workers desiring more interesting and autonomous jobs. The decline or stability in intrinsic work rewards is found within categories of workers who express different desires for such job characteristics.
Consistent with post-Fordist interpretations of information technology, about two thirds of respondents in the 1998 GSS expressed the belief that new technology would make work more interesting. However, occupationlevel fixed effects models indicate no relationship between changes in the percentage of computer users in an occupation and mean perceptions of how interesting respondents found their work (not shown). 3 Likewise, there is no cross-sectional relationship between computer use and overall job satisfaction, with or without controls for background characteristics, using the GSS 2000 survey (not shown).
There is, then, no evidence that workers perceived their jobs to be more interesting or autonomous in 1998 compared to 1989, which contradicts the view that employers are providing more meaningful work either in response to workers' needs or because they find that changing product markets or information technology impels them to offer such work. Overall, controlling for the rising value workers placed on this job characteristic, it appears that employees found their work less interesting over the course of the 1990s.
OTHER WORKING CONDITIONS
Neo-Fordist theory argues that employers have intensified the effort that they require from workers in response to an increasingly competitive economic environment and that employees work more hours to offset declining pay rates. However, the postindustrial aspect of post-Fordist theory argues that automation is making work less physically arduous. The GSS has a number of items on working conditions and effort levels that relate to this aspect of the job quality debate.
The descriptive data in Table 2 suggest little change in the number of workers who find work stressful and some increase in the number of workers who say they come home from work exhausted, but the full model for the latter in Table 5 suggests that the effect is restricted mostly to clerical workers. Clerical workers also reported substantially greater stress and physical demands in 1998 compared to 1989 (Table 5 ). 4 It is unclear what might be responsible for deterioration in job quality among clerical workers, particularly the reported increase in hard physical work, but it is possible that leaner staffing and increasingly computer-paced work have increased effort demands for clerical workers over time. None of these results supports post-Fordist expectations, though only the results for clerical workers actually contradict it.
Also contrary to post-Fordist theory, less skilled blue-collar and service work involved more physical effort than other occupations in 1989. And the reported frequency of hard physical work actually increased among these groups by 1998 (Table 5) . Similarly, the frequency of dangerous work did not decline significantly overall between 1989 and 1998 either in raw terms (Table 2) or after controlling for compositional variables (Table 5) , and there is no significant interaction of year with income or occupation.
Finally, contrary to neo-Fordist theory, the relative number of workers reporting they worked so hard that it interfered with their nonwork life declined significantly between 1989 and 1998, and there is no significant interaction of year with income or occupation ( Table 2 and Table 5 ). It is not clear how to reconcile this finding with the absence of a similar downward trend in stress and exhaustion from work. However, it seems fair to say that there is little evidence of the overworked American in these self-reports (cf. Schor, 1991) , though there does not appear to have been any improvement in most of these working conditions either, and physical demands seem to have increased for a number of occupations. The dominant picture that emerges from these analyses is the lack of great change in working conditions generally. Some groups, such as clerical and blue-collar workers, experienced deteriorating conditions on some dimensions, as neo-Fordist theory predicts, but there is also a broadly shared perception among workers that their work is not as hard now compared to previously, as post-Fordist theory implies. These mixed and somewhat inconsistent results do not give a strong indication as to the trends in these dimensions of job quality.
QUALITY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AT WORK
The final dimension of job quality is the quality of interpersonal relations at work. If teamwork has diffused as widely as post-Fordist theory claims (Osterman, 1994) and has been successful, one would expect improved relations between management and workers and among coworkers. Indeed, one of the traditional motivations for introducing teams has been to improve workplace cooperation and organizational climate. By contrast, if neo-Fordist theory is correct, one would expect a deterioration in labor-management relations resulting from continued stagnation and inequality in material conditions and the intensification of work.
Both descriptive results (Table 2 ) and the regression models (Table 5 ) indicate some improvements in relations between workers and employers and even more so among coworkers between 1989 and 1998. 5 These results do not suggest growing friction between management and workers as neo-Fordist theory implies and may reflect either positive efforts at work reform, such as high performance work practices, or simply the improved labor market of the late 1990s, which may have done much to improve all social relations at work.
DISCUSSION
Competing neo-Fordist and post-Fordist theories imply significant and generally opposing trends in job quality along several dimensions, but workers'perceptions, with some exceptions, were surprisingly stable in the 1990s. Different theories suggest workers should feel better or worse off than previously, but workers themselves mostly did not perceive the quality of their jobs as better or worse than in the past, nor does the stable average mask a widening inequality in reported job quality. This general stability is also not explained by changes in the composition of the workforce, nor was the stability in overall job satisfaction explained by offsetting changes in measures of more specific job dimensions, most of which show a similar stability.
Only in the area of job security is there clear evidence of change in subjective perceptions corresponding to observed declines in objective measures of job security for upper-level workers. There seemed to be some tendency to perceive work as less interesting in the 1990s despite the growth in information technology and respondents' own reported belief that technology would make work more interesting. There also seemed to be an improvement in interpersonal relations at work, particularly among coworkers, but also between management and employees. Whether this is due to more cooperative management practices or to the positive effects of the tighter labor market is difficult to determine.
CONCLUSION
Although there are many studies on the changing objective qualities of work and employment, there are few studies that examine trends in how workers themselves feel about their jobs. The question naturally arises as to whether the observed stability implies existing theories overstate objective labor market trends or whether complexities in the ways that objective conditions affect subjective perceptions may contribute to stable perceptions despite objective changes. The following can only sketch some of these possibilities for future research to investigate.
COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE BARRIERS TO PERCEPTIONS
Social indicators research has often found relatively weak relationships between objective and subjective measures of quality of life (Schuessler & Fisher, 1985, p. 145) . Coarseness of response categories may introduce measurement error such that only large changes in objective conditions alter the distribution of responses.
Job satisfaction items may be subject to social desirability response biases because they force respondents to confront issues of whether they live up to dominant social standards or their own individual aspirations, as some critics of John Goldthorpe's Affluent Worker study and others have argued (Barbash, 1976; Fantasia, 1988; Freeman & Rogers, 1999, p. 23-24, 43ff.; Mann, 1973) .
In the case of earnings, inflation may dampen dissatisfaction with stagnant personal earnings by making it hard to distinguish real from nominal pay increases, an example of so-called money illusion. Earnings growth over the life cycle may also generate a sense of personal advancement that offsets negative perceptions or inhibits awareness of a flattening trend in ageearnings profiles across birth cohorts (Osberg, 2000) .
Cognitive barriers to perceiving changes in one's own income relative to those of others may also dampen reactions to changes in inequality. For many years, mainstream economists disputed Bluestone and Harrison's (1982) claim that inequality grew in the 1980s (e.g., Kosters & Ross, 1987 Lawrence, 1983 Lawrence, , 1984 Lerman & Salzman, 1988) . It would not be surprising if the general population, with limited access to official statistics and analyses, experienced similar difficulties.
Arguing against the view that reported perceptions are poor reflections of objective conditions are the significant correlations among perceived earnings levels and actual log earnings (.32) and raw earnings (.40) in the pooled GSS sample. There is an even larger correlation between general perceptions of job security and more specific perceptions of the likelihood of job loss in the next 12 months (.50), a measure whose sample mean itself correlates .85 with the national unemployment rate across the full GSS time series for the years 1977 to 1996 (author's calculations; Schmidt & Thompson, 1997, p. 7 , Figure 2 ). The QES data also showed that as economic conditions deteriorated in the 1970s perceptions of material rewards fell as well.
Evidence reviewed earlier suggests that objective changes in job tasks such as employee involvement practices are also associated in the expected manner with subjective perceptions such as greater job satisfaction and autonomy. Easterlin (1996; Easterlin & Crimmins, 1991) and others have found that people often adjust their subjective standards in response to changing objective conditions. Thus, income and self-reported happiness of Americans were positively correlated in cross-sectional surveys, but happiness did not rise over time despite dramatic gains in average incomes, at least in the first half of the postwar period. People simply readjusted their standards to reflect the rising norms of what constituted an adequate income and evaluated their life circumstances relative to the new standard (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2000; Easterlin, 1996; Frey & Stutzer, 2002; Oswald, 1997) . This upward readjustment of standards, known as the Easterlin paradox or the hedonic treadmill, produced stable levels of reported well-being that masked genuine improvements in objective living conditions. Research indicates that people also adjust their standards in response to worsening objective conditions. After experiencing misfortune, there is a transition period after which people report generally similar levels of happiness as they had previously, as if they were returning to a fixed set-point (Kahneman et al., 1999) .
ADAPTABLE STANDARDS
Richard
Objective changes in life circumstances have a genuine impact on welfare insofar as individuals would judge themselves better or worse off relative to a previous norm. It is simply that most people usually compare their situations to current norms, imparting a stability bias to subjective perceptions. Thus, it is possible that the growth of upper white-collar jobs, the diffusion of computers, and the growth of employee involvement have made work more interesting and satisfying, but once they are taken for granted, their effects on perceptions diminish even though they represent genuine welfare gains relative to previous working conditions.
Likewise, adaptation to negative change might also explain the stability in other perceptions and the broader political quiescence of the last 25 years. Reflecting on several years of earnings stagnation in the 1970s, Joanne Martin (1981) predicted workers would experience growing feelings of relative deprivation that would lead to greater class conflict. However, after another decade of restructuring, high unemployment, wage stagnation, and inequality growth, Paul Krugman (1990, p. xi) concluded that the prevailing mood was one of diminished expectations rather than of frustrated expectations and consequently greater political passivity.
This view was echoed by Federal Reserve Bank chairman Alan Greenspan (1998) , among others, who concluded that downsizing during the 1990s lowered expectations and led to voluntary wage restraint even when unemployment fell below levels expected to generate inflationary wage pressures (p. 81; Stiglitz, 1997, p. 7; Uchitelle, 1997) . However, attempts to formally test whether increased job insecurity led to wage restraint in the 1990s have produced weak results (Aaronson & Sullivan, 1998 Schmidt & Thompson, 1997) .
By way of conclusion, one might say that although the competing explanations cannot be fully adjudicated here, it seems more likely that stability in objective conditions, rather than cognitive and affective constraints, accounts for the stability of subjective perceptions. On balance, individuals' perceptions of both material and intrinsic job rewards seem reasonably wellgrounded in objective conditions. Thus, it seems most plausible to conclude that earnings perceptions did not change greatly during the 1990s because absolute earnings were also stable and because changes in inequality were either sufficiently subtle to remain relatively unnoticed or not something that workers cared deeply about when evaluating their personal situation. The decline in perceived job security among more privileged workers also accurately reflected their increased job displacement rates.
The absence of either negative or positive trends in perceptions of intrinsic rewards suggests that neither more controlling nor genuinely empowering work practices were more common during the 1990s. Despite superficially high adoption rates, many employer-reported programs are likely rather nominal efforts reflecting current management fashion rather than fundamental change in the structure of work, as neoinstitutional theory suggests (Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) .
Although one cannot rule out the possibility that stability in perceived job quality reflects the readjustment of evaluative standards in response to changes that have genuine effects on well-being, the preceding suggests that the main reason for stable perceptions in the 1990s is a general stability in objective conditions. Both neo-Fordist and post-Fordist theory seem to have overstated changes in the workplace and effects on employee welfare, but this conclusion must be viewed as tentative. Adjudicating this question more conclusively will require national data collected at different points in time with consistent and strong measures of workplace organization and workers' perceptions to decide whether or in which respects the stability in workers' subjective well-being reflects stability in actual conditions rather than complexities in workers' subjective reactions to them.
